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Abstract 
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On Tuesday 18 March 2003 the Prime Minister John Howard moved a motion in the 
House of Representatives, in order to advance the government’s claim that Iraq’s 
‘possession and pursuit of weapons of mass destruction’ constituted ‘a real and 
unacceptable threat to international peace and security’ (CAPD 2003a, p. 12505), that 
Australia’s commitment of military forces to the Gulf with the intention of disarming 
Iraq of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as a response to this threat was justified, 
and that this action was legitimised by successive UN Security Council resolutions, 
most notably Resolution 1441. The Opposition response was to oppose the motion on 
the grounds that while the disarmament of Iraq was a desirable objective, unilateral 
means were to be rejected in favour of entrusting the task to the United Nations 
(CAPD 2003a, p. 12510). In the preceding major debate on the Iraq question, 
conducted in response to a speech by the Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, on 
Iraq’s decision to re-admit weapons inspectors, Iraqi WMD capabilities and ambitions 
were a central element in Downer’s assessment of the dangers posed unless Saddam 
Hussein was compelled to disarm (CAPD 2002, pp. 6378–85). As the Prime Minister 
said on the eve of the Iraq war, without these weapons the anticipated invasion could 
not be justified. ‘I would have to accept that if Iraq had genuinely disarmed, I couldn’t 
justify on its own a military invasion of Iraq to change the regime. I’ve never 
advocated that’ (Howard 2003).  
It is now a matter of historical record that the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), 
despite its best efforts, could not find the WMD in question. So essential were these 
weapons to the government’s case for the Iraq commitment that even in 2004 the fact 
of their absence could not be squarely faced. The official post-conflict statement on 
Iraq addressed the matter in the following terms:  
 
All we have learned since the war confirms that the Coalition was right to 
take decisive action. The Iraq Survey Group has revealed that Saddam 
Hussein was continuing to pursue WMD and had no intention of foregoing 
his WMD ambitions. Military action to remove Saddam was the only means 
by which the international community could be assured he would not use 
WMD again. (DFAT 2004a, p. 4)  
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Saddam Hussein was thus removed for harbouring and refusing to relinquish not 
WMD but ambition. Much had changed since March 2003. 
The period since 11 September 2001 was one in which appeals to and reliance 
upon intelligence were unusually prominent and also in which expenditure on 
intelligence collection and analysis expanded significantly. In the 2004–05 federal 
government budget, additional funding of $227.8 million was provided for the 
intelligence services for the coming three years. If pre-emption in any form is to be 
considered as a policy option, intelligence must be especially sound since it relates 
both to the capability as well as to the firm intention of possible antagonists. This is 
even more the case if those antagonists are non-state actors and their networks secret. 
As the ‘war on terrorism’ assumed centre-stage, government assertions that it 
operated on the basis of the best intelligence became a major feature justifying its 
policies. The reasons for this strategy were, as Richard Mulgan has noted, more 
complex than might at first appear. Appeal to privileged and apparently disinterested 
information provided a firm foundation for war-like state action; at the same time, 
policy failure could subsequently be attributed to poor advice. In the context of 
evident cases of the poor management of intelligence systems and with the basis of 
those policies now exposed as erroneous, further appeals to intelligence exposed the 
government to the danger of greater public distrust while also adding to the pressure 
of FOI legislation to disclose enough of the record to make the original policy choice 
intelligible (Mulgan 2006). This latter tendency might itself actually impel the further 
politicization of intelligence. 
 
Intelligence and SIEVs 
 
Although differences over Iraq have been the most important source of intelligence 
controversy following the terrorist attacks in the US, it was an incident that had no 
apparent connection with the war on terrorism or the doctrine of pre-emption that first 
brought the issue of the government’s use of intelligence, and especially of the 
intelligence agencies, to prominence in the domestic debate.  
On 7 October 2001 during the interception by HMAS Adelaide of (‘Suspected 
Illegal Entry Vessel’) SIEV 4, it was inferred, on the basis of an oral report of what 
was then a current operation, that refugees on board the vessel had thrown children 
into the water. Internal inquires in the Department of Defence as well as a 
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parliamentary inquiry later established this inference was incorrect. Within days, 
however, it had become a vital election issue though its basis in fact was already 
under challenge within the Australian Defence Force (ADF) (as a result of a signal 
sent to Defence by the ship commander on 10 October). When doubts arose regarding 
this incident, the Prime Minister maintained a dogged adherence to the original 
version of this story, citing an Office of National Assessments (ONA) report as 
justification for his judgement and claiming that nothing he had learned since had 
caused him to revise it. He repeated this point in a number of interviews conducted on 
the eve of the election, saying on 8 November, ‘I was provided with written advice 
from intelligence sources on the 10th of October to the effect that people on the 
[refugee] vessel had jumped into the water and that children had been thrown into the 
water’ (Howard 2001). 
However, after Estimates hearings had dealt extensively with the issue, the 
Senate established a Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident which began its 
hearings in March 2002 and submitted a final report in October of that year. This 
inquiry, which cast serious doubt on the government’s claims, determined that the 
basis of the often cited intelligence report was highly dubious. It quotes from the 
testimony at a Senate Estimates Committee hearing of (then) ONA Director-General 
Kim Jones who, in responding to a request on 7 November from the Prime Minister’s 
international adviser, Miles Jordana, for documentation on the incident, located an 
ONA report (226/2001) on the issue. Although this report apparently repeated the 
original claim regarding the incident (Senate Select Committee on a Certain Maritime 
Incident 2002, 6.83, p. 123), the Director-General advised Jordana at the time that its 
basis was ‘ministers’ statements’ rather than independent intelligence. In discussing 
the use by the Prime Minister of this material, the Director-General noted that the 
original report was classified, that only four sentences of it referred to this particular 
incident, and that he could not recall the last time such material from ONA was 
publicly quoted by a government (SF&PALC 2002, p. 133).  
This controversy has been canvassed extensively since that time for the 
messages it conveys regarding the modern doctrine of ministerial responsibility and 
executive veracity (Smith 2002; Weller 2002). What is noteworthy for the current 
paper is the fact that the findings of ONA – and thus classified and unchallengeable 
materials – were used to support the government’s account of events. Once the 
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spurious basis of the claim was revealed, distrust of the use of the intelligence 
agencies for what could be interpreted as partisan purposes grew.  
Subsequent revelations throughout the second Howard term about the events 
of October 2001 regarding the background to the government’s use of and appeals to 
intelligence reinforced this distrust. Immediately prior to the 2004 elections the Senate 
appointed a select committee to hear evidence from Michael Scrafton, formerly 
Defence Minister Peter Reith’s senior adviser. Scrafton had not been a witness at the 
original ‘Certain Maritime Incident’ hearings, but in August 2004 had published in 
the press his account of his role at the time. He had been directed to view video 
evidence provided by the Navy of the children overboard incident and to form an 
opinion of it. The members of the Select Committee heard Scrafton explain that in a 
telephone conversation with the Prime Minister on 7 November he offered the same 
opinion that he had shared earlier in the day with the Defence Minister, namely, that 
the video material contained no images of children being thrown overboard (Senate 
Select Committee on the Scrafton Evidence 2004, pp. 10–11). According to Scrafton, 
he had already advised both the Minister and Jordana on or about 10 October that 
photographic evidence purporting to illustrate children being thrown into the sea was 
not supportive of this claim. 
On 19 October 2001, when much public attention was focused upon the story 
of SIEV 4 and its impact on the campaign for the federal election, 353 would-be 
asylum-seekers drowned when their dangerously overloaded vessel (later dubbed the 
SIEV X) sank en route to Christmas Island from Bandar Lampung in Indonesia. At 
first this was represented as a human tragedy in which Australia was not directly 
involved. The Prime Minister repeatedly referred to the event as having occurred ‘in 
Indonesian waters’. But when the issue was explored at the Senate Committee 
established to review the SIEV 4 story, evidence emerged that the government knew 
more (Kevin 2004; Marr and Wilkinson 2004). This fact was established in part by 
the eventual release, long after the Senate Committee had concluded its work, of a 
cable from the Jakarta embassy dated 23 October (Hutton 2003). It was now apparent 
that the area where the boat sank was within the aerial surveillance zone established 
under Operation RELEX to give early warning of SIEV voyages, and that this was 
known from the first though the point was obfuscated by departmental spokespersons.  
In those circumstances, and especially if as seemed likely an Airforce P3 had 
been operating in the area, it was at the very least a clear intelligence failure that the 
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boat or its rescuers were not sighted. There were also unanswered questions regarding 
the responsibilities Australia might have assumed to rescue the survivors if 
information that was known, including about the boat’s departure and state of 
seaworthiness, had been properly assessed. Further, the claim was made that some of 
the principals involved in the dispatch of the vessel may well have been cooperating 
with a continuing program on the part of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the 
Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) to disrupt people smuggling operations 
in Indonesia. The AFP Commissioner refused to deal with this particular question 
when testifying before the Senate (Kevin 2004, pp. 201–25). The SIEV X incident 
occurred when a ‘whole-of-government’ approach was taken through the convening 
of a ‘People Smuggling Taskforce’ which involved an unprecedented coordination of 
the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA), the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), the Department of Prime Minister & Cabinet 
(DPM&C), the AFP, Defence and the ADF. The fact that this overall strategy had 
earned the government considerable political dividends generated concern that 
partisanship had entered what had hitherto been bureaucratic preserves. 
 
The debate on intelligence reform 
 
This perception of partisanship was undoubtedly enhanced as a result of the Iraq 
experience. As in the United States and Britain so in Australia, the absence of WMD 
in Iraq, especially given the many claims by governments that intelligence had 
established their indubitable existence, led to demands that the basis for the invasion 
policy be critically examined. On the eve of the invasion, the decision by ONA senior 
analyst Andrew Wilkie to resign and take the message to the media that there were 
insufficient grounds for war severely embarrassed the government (Wilkie 2004). In 
retrospect, even Wilkie’s view of Iraq’s WMD capacity proved to be an over-estimate. 
Following the launching of enquiries at Westminster and in Washington, the 
Senate decided on 18 June 2003 to refer the matter to the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on ASIO (Australian Security Intelligence Organisation), ASIS and DSD 
(Defence Signals Directorate). The Committee, chaired by David Jull, was tasked ‘to 
consider the nature, accuracy and independence of the intelligence used by the 
Australian government and the accuracy and completeness of the presentation of that 
intelligence by the Australian government to the Parliament and people of Australian 
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[sic]’ (PJCAAD 2004, p. vi). While, unlike its UK counterpart, it was not permitted to 
review the complete record of relevant intelligence assessments, and its report had to 
be cleared by government ministers before its publication, its deliberations and the 
report that it released in December 2003 were quite revealing of its subject.  
The Committee recommended that the government commission an intelligence 
specialist to review the complete record of Australia’s agencies regarding reporting on 
Iraq. This recommendation was one of the factors that led to the decision by the Prime 
Minister, on 4 March 2004, to enlist Philip Flood (a former Director of ONA and 
Ambassador to Indonesia) to prepare a report on the issue. Flood had the advantage of 
seeing all relevant classified materials, and his report was not released until 20 July 
2004 which enabled him to check his findings against those of the US Senate 
Intelligence Committee whose review of the same issues appeared on 7 July (US 
Senate 2004). He was also able to see an early version of the Butler Committee 
review of UK intelligence on Iraq which was also published on 20 July (Butler 2004). 
As his report and that of the Parliamentary Committee traverse much of the same 
ground, for this reason they will be considered here together.  
There were two interesting differences between the Parliamentary Committee 
and the Flood findings. First, the Committee was much more explicit on the 
divergences between ONA and Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) analyses of 
Iraq. It located an important shift in ONA opinion as having occurred in mid-
September 2002, and traced this shift directly to events in the US and the UK: ‘it 
appears that after this date ONA is influenced by the more assertive claims being 
made in Britain and the United States at that time’ (PJCAAD 2004, p. 33). Flood 
dated the divergence, such as it was, between DIO and ONA to a less precise period 
between late 2002 and early 2003, and rejected the suggestion that this was the 
manifest result of external influence.  
Second, unlike Flood, the Committee tackled directly the issue of which 
intelligence the government had relied upon in its decision to wage war, a decision 
based squarely upon claims about Iraqi WMD. As its report noted, ‘the case made by 
the government was that Iraq possessed WMD in large quantities and posed a grave 
and unacceptable threat to the region and the world, particularly as there was a danger 
that Iraq’s WMD might be passed to terrorist organisations’ (PJCAAD 2004, p. 93). 
However, the report went on to assert, ‘This is not the picture that emerges from an 
examination of all the assessments provided to the Committee by Australia’s two 
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analytical agencies’ (PJCAAD 2004, p. 93). Although ONA did believe it was ‘highly 
likely’ that Iraq possessed WMD, the Office held that the quantities were small and 
the threat they posed far from immediate. What, then, was the basis of the 
government’s position? It rested, apparently, on judgements deriving from the US and 
the UK. The Committee described the position thus: 
 
The statements by the Prime Minister and Ministers are more strongly worded 
than most of the AIC [Australian Intelligence Community] judgements. This is 
in part because they quote directly from the findings of the British and 
American intelligence agencies. In particular, in the 4 February 2003 speech to 
the House of Representatives, the Prime Minister quoted the findings of Joint 
Intelligence Committee of the UK and the key judgements of the National 
Intelligence Estimate of the CIA. In both of these documents the uncertainties 
had been removed and they relied heavily on the surge of new and largely 
untested intelligence, coming, in the US at least, from Iraqi defectors. These 
dossiers comprised stronger, more emphatic statements than Australian 
agencies had been prepared to make. … ONA agreed that these judgements, 
quoted in the speeches, were not necessarily ones that they might have made, 
but that, as they were made on the basis of material ONA had not seen, the 
quotations in the speeches were not questioned. They were considered 
accurate quotations, in the sense of transcriptions, from the British and US 
documents (PJCAAD 2004, p. 94, emphasis added). 
 
In other words, when asked to verify the intelligence content of the government’s key 
claims, ONA restricted that verification to checking that content against the US and 
UK documents in question. This is tantamount to the claim that if asked to verify 
British government assertions that the earth was flat, ONA would not consult 
scientists but would rather review back issues of the British Hansard to determine that 
Tony Blair was quoted correctly. 
What went wrong? According to Flood, there was a ‘lack of a rigorous culture 
of challenge’, insufficient attention to gaps that might exist in intelligence, and in the 
case of ONA there were too few resources to devote to such a major issue. There was 
no evidence of political pressure, though the work of the intelligence agencies was 
poorly integrated and DIO was not sufficiently focused on the needs of its primary 
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military client. On Iraq, Australian intelligence came to independent judgements and 
did not merely follow US (or British) assessments. Here there was a significant 
difference between Flood’s view and that of the Parliamentary Committee. Flood 
emphasised that it was not all a story of flawed judgements. The performance of the 
intelligence community, he asserted, was a good deal better, for example, in relation 
to anticipation of the instability experienced by the Solomon Islands from 2000.  
Wilkie’s interpretation of this story, and especially ONA’s shift towards a 
more definitive and critical representation of Iraq’s weapons capability, accords 
centrality to the role of political considerations:  
 
The Australian government’s extraordinary request in mid-September [2002] 
for an unclassified report for use in the preparation of the Prime Minister’s 
and Foreign Minister’s speeches sent a clear signal to ONA to deliver 
something much stronger, something to back up the government’s 
enthusiasm for war. ONA delivered, even though it propelled the Office into 
the fantasy land hitherto occupied chiefly by the CIA [Central Intelligence 
Agency]. Crucially, ONA is not a policy organization and does not normally 
prepare unclassified notes for anyone’s public speeches (Wilkie 2004, p. 
142). 
 
Geoffrey Barker comes to a similar judgement (Barker 2003). The Parliamentary 
inquiry notes the production on 13 September 2002 of an unclassified report on Iraq 
which was drawn upon for ministerial speeches and which, a careful textual analysis 
shows, was devoid of those qualification regarding Saddam Hussein’s capabilities and 
intentions as well as in respect of the surety of the evidence available on these topics 
that had previously marked ONA product (PJCAAD 2004, p. 32). In the same month, 
the CIA and the British government both produced unclassified documents setting out 
their similar views of the dangers of Iraq’s WMD status. And it was on 12 September 
2002 that President George W. Bush, addressing the UN General Assembly on the 
Iraq crisis, stated of Saddam Hussein that ‘a regime that has lost its legitimacy will 
also lose its power’ (Bush 2002). 
Flood’s brief was more extensive than that of the Parliamentary Committee, 
since he was charged also with suggesting reforms. Accordingly, he proposed a 
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number of changes to the organisation, oversight, resourcing and coordination of 
intelligence.  
The test of a proposed public policy reform is to consider what change in 
performance could have been expected if it had been implemented prior to the 
emergence of the problem to which it was a response. Here there was something of a 
paradox in Flood’s proposals. Of the two intelligence agencies, the performance of 
ONA was inferior, on his assessment, to that of DIO. In particular, on the crucial issue 
of WMD in Iraq, with war clearly on the horizon, DIO did not alter its original 
caution whereas ONA changed its position – Flood was not sure whether to say this 
occurred in late 2002 or early 2003 (c/f Flood 2004, pp. 27, 34). As Flood stated, 
‘ONA’s judgement, while reasonably argued, has not been borne out by what has 
been found in Iraq, and DIO’s caution has been justified’ (Flood 2004, p. 29). Flood, 
however, proposed that more resources be given to ONA, and DIO be restrained from 
trespassing into the sphere of political and economic assessments but rather tailor its 
product more specifically to the practical needs of the ADF and ADF deployments. 
In the commercial world, the market rewards ‘winners’ and punishes ‘losers’, 
and chief executives whose business decisions lead to good company performance 
receive bonuses. In Flood’s bureaucratic world, the reverse was the case. Though 
Frank Lewincamp’s leadership was credited for the positive culture of contestability 
to be found in DIO and he was not subject to specific criticism, Flood spent a good 
deal of time musing on the alleged improvements that would flow from a person of 
military experience occupying the post of Director (as had been the case in the past), 
and even proposed a new deputy position for the organisation, to be occupied by a 
civilian if the Director was a member of the ADF. It was difficult to read these 
passages as other than a rebuke for Lewincamp (being a civilian), whose role was 
discussed directly on four occasions. ONA’s leadership, however, was not placed 
under any scrutiny; indeed its Director-General was not even named in the text of the 
report. One was left to consider what a figure from outside the bureaucratic 
environment might not have made of these matters. Lewincamp was subsequently 
transferred from his position in 2004, to be replaced by an ADF officer. 
Flood also proposed a rationalisation of the mechanisms for scrutiny by 
parliament and also by the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) of 
the various intelligence services. A degree of bureaucratic tidying would result (of the 
kind also proposed by Flood’s UK counterparts), but it is hard to imagine that a 
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greater role for the Parliamentary Committee in oversight of ONA and DIO, though 
no doubt desirable, would have had any impact, positive or otherwise, on the Iraq 
intelligence fiasco.  
One measure Flood did suggest might well have had a powerful effect. If it 
can be assumed that in 2002–03 the problem was excessive zeal on the part of 
politicians, and especially the Prime Minister, to commit the nation to war irrespective 
of the evidence or of the advice, then Flood’s ‘reforms’ might well have exacerbated 
rather than mitigated this trend. It should be recalled that if there was any element of 
Flood’s otherwise anodyne text that stated any criticism of the political management 
of intelligence, it was the suggestion that the use of the Office of National 
Assessments to verify the intelligence accuracy of the speeches of the Prime Minister 
and other ministers, as well as the public release of intelligence material, did not 
proceed within a sufficiently clear framework. Flood suggested formalising the 
guidelines whereby intelligence product or judgements drawn from it could enter the 
public realm. Under the proposed arrangements, the Prime Minister would be obliged 
to put a request of this kind in writing to the Director of ONA, and in its execution 
‘there should be no influence from ministers and their offices or from policy 
departments’ (Flood 2004, p. 160). But no actual mechanism was suggested that 
would achieve this laudable objective. Indeed it is arguable that, by formalising the 
procedure, the use of intelligence assets for partisan purposes might become more 
commonplace.  
Further, Flood proposed that the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 
should take direct charge of the DIO and ONA forward work programs, and hold the 
power of the purse to require the agencies to ‘bid’ for resources. Currently the budget 
of DIO is controlled by the Defence Department. It does not take too much 
imagination to conceive of a scenario where the intelligence agencies would be even 
more assiduous in composing their product with their political masters in mind lest 
they suffer a reduction in their resources. It should also be remembered that the most 
frequently repeated contemporary criticism of the Australian system of federal 
governance derives from the excessive concentration of power in the hands of the 
Prime Minister and his office, the latter containing ever growing numbers of political 
advisers, usually individuals from bureaucratic departments but by virtue of their 
positions answerable only to the Prime Minister and removed from parliamentary 
oversight (Weller 2002). These recommendations from Flood would further centralise 
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prime ministerial power. It is perhaps unsurprising that the Prime Minister endorsed 
the substance of all of these recommendations. Accordingly it was announced that 
ONA staffing would increase from seventy-five to 150 by 2006, and the Director-
General would also chair a new Foreign Intelligence Coordination Committee. 
There is an alternative view of the Iraq issue. This holds that the government’s 
decision on Iraq was not based on intelligence, sound or otherwise, but was rather 
derived from calculations regarding the US alliance (Garran 2004, pp. 137–65; Grant 
2004, pp. 103–29). With the passage of time, this view seems the more plausible. If it 
is correct, appeals to intelligence and advice, of course, were mere window dressing 
and the intelligence role in government decision-making was thus minor. This 
assessment soon came to be held by many US analysts (Anonymous 2004; Bamford 
2004; Hersh 2004). It follows that the various reviews of intelligence were all beside 
the point, and reorganisation of the intelligence community would hardly address the 
root of the problem if, indeed, the uncritical adherence to the US alliance (a topic 
beyond the scope of this paper) was so regarded. 
 
Intelligence advantages and liabilities in military cooperation with the US 
 
So far, the intelligence contribution to Australia’s role in the Iraq invasion appears to 
have been minimal. The government apparently ignored DIO’s caution and in relying 
upon the ONA assessment was really relying – whether or not this was clearly 
acknowledged – on the opinions of the coalition leaders. However, intelligence of a 
different kind undoubtedly played a part in the commitment of Australian forces. 
From the outset, the Australian government was very keen to participate in the ‘war 
on terrorism’ and the performance of Special Air Service forces in Afghanistan 
impressed US military leaders. As the Defence Minister was later to state, this 
commitment and the acceptance of the main propositions that were the basis of the US 
campaign gave Australia ‘unprecedented’ access to US military planning and 
intelligence (Wright 2003, p. 32). In late July 2002 the National Security Committee 
of cabinet is reported to have met to approve direct military participation in the Iraq 
war. Through ADF personnel at the US Central Command in Tampa, Florida – who 
had originally been posted there in October 2001 – a part was found for Australian 
forces in the forthcoming invasion. As the official account stated, ‘By August 2002, 
our joint operations planning staff had developed a good understanding of 
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contingency plans being developed by the US’ (DOD 2004b, p. 9). Subsequent 
accounts of US planning make plain that prior to the invasion being somewhat 
imperfectly considered at the policy level, the preparations of the military – using the 
compartmental code-name POLO STEP (Arkin 2005, p. 461) – were very far 
advanced (Anonymous 2004; Bamford 2004; Woodward 2004).  
The nature of Australia’s commitment was well known in military and 
intelligence circles in Canberra by September, prior to the first major debate on Iraq 
in the parliament (Woodward 2002; Wright 2003; Wilkie 2004, p. 73). It is also 
generally accepted that neither the US nor the British cabinets ever reviewed in a 
formal sense the issue of an Iraq commitment (Woodward 2004; Short 2004, pp. 146–
50). A classified document that appeared during the 2005 British election campaign 
suggested that a meeting of senior foreign policy and security officials convened by 
Blair on 23 July 2002 discussed Iraq not in terms of whether an invasion was 
warranted but rather what grounds could be found for a campaign that had already 
been decided (Danner 2005). In the light of this timetable, whatever the conflicting 
assessments of the intelligence agencies, their findings were probably incidental to the 
major policy decisions. As a scholarly work, by a former Australian ambassador, on 
the Vietnam commitment that appeared in 2004 concluded, the uncanny resemblances 
between this episode and the Iraq case indicated that very little had been learned about 
the management of the alliance with the US in the interim (Woodard 2004). In both 
cases military commitments were proposed in order to serve alliance objectives, with 
intelligence-derived consideration of the precise role of the forces eventually 
dispatched coming after the event.  
Nevertheless, the Iraq war and the occupation generated a series of difficulties 
for the intelligence agencies and the responsible ministers in the government. 
Australia participated in the Iraq invasion in keeping with the government’s strategy 
to deal with global terrorism. Given, in Foreign Minister Downer’s words, that 
terrorists acquiring WMD from rogue states would prove to be the ‘ultimate 
nightmare’ (Downer 2003), such states could not be trusted unless they disarmed of 
their own volition or were disarmed. Amongst intelligence specialists, the generally – 
though not universally – held view of the Iraq invasion was that it increased rather 
than reduced the threat of terrorism. Not only could it be interpreted as contrary to 
international law, but it was bound to generate casualties, destruction and violence, all 
of which could be construed as exemplary of the alleged contempt of the West for 
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Islamic believers and their civilization (Anonymous 2004; Clarke 2004, pp. 286–7). 
On the logic of either of these positions, any of the actions of the occupying powers 
that led to casualties or suffering exposed the ‘West’, and especially the coalition 
countries, to greater terrorist danger. Therefore it was imperative that the greatest care 
be taken to minimise those outcomes. When, in late January 2005, the international 
media began carrying reports of the abuse and torture of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib, 
many of whom appeared to have been detained almost at random, this seemed an 
issue virtually calculated to compound immeasurably the problems (however they 
were interpreted) inherent in the original invasion strategy (Hersh 2004). 
At first this catastrophe appeared to be a responsibility exclusively of the chief 
coalition members, the US and Britain. Australia, with its minimal forces in the 
country (many of whom were engaged in protecting its own citizens), provided 
neither gaolers nor interrogators. However, details emerged of an Australian part in 
the detention and investigation of Iraqi citizens on the part of the occupying powers. 
Not only were some Australian personnel involved in the various detention regimes 
used in Iraq, but in discharging their responsibilities they were placed potentially to 
give the government early warning of the dangers inherent in the abusive detention 
practices exhibited at Abu Ghraib. 
In October 2003 a delegation from the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) visited the Abu Ghraib and Camp Cropper detention facilities, and 
drafted a report on conditions therein. The ICRC was concerned about practices at 
Abu Ghraib which violated the Geneva Conventions, including the deliberate 
humiliation and mistreatment of prisoners. It emerged that an ADF legal officer, 
Major George O’Kane, who was attached to the Coalition Force Headquarters, had 
the responsibility of drafting a reply to the original ICRC report. O’Kane was working 
on this draft in November and had visited Abu Ghraib, as had some other Australian 
personnel. In January 2004 he assisted with a further visit by the ICRC which then 
assembled and provided to Force Headquarters a very critical report on the detention 
regimes. Even before the gruesome pictures of detainees became widely available in 
April, the US military had also produced a damning assessment of these regimes. 
When the first account of O’Kane’s role appeared in the press (Allard 2004), the 
Defence Department, the Defence Minister Robert Hill and the Prime Minister all 
denied that the government had had any knowledge of the abuses at Abu Ghraib prior 
to the April media reports. In Parliament on 27 May, the Prime Minister even declared 
  15
‘contemptible’ the media attempt, as he interpreted it, to ‘imply some kind of guilt by 
association’ (CAPD 2004d, pp. 29379–80).  
It subsequently emerged that Major O’Kane had brought the ICRC October 
report and other relevant documents back to Defence when he returned from Iraq in 
February, though the Minister claimed that these did not reach the International Policy 
Division of Defence until 11 May where even then their significance was not 
immediately recognised (CAPD 2004e, p. 23939). Minister Hill was adamant, 
however, that ‘Australia did not interrogate prisoners’ and that he had no prior 
knowledge of the abuses. Given the immense and predictable impact the images 
concerned had in the Islamic world, and the fact that from the first the ICRC was 
concerned with violations of the Geneva Conventions, Defence and government 
management of intelligence regarding the crucial situation in occupied Iraq was at 
best extremely poor. Moreover, the incremental way in which this story emerged 
largely through Senate Committee hearings (which Major O’Kane was forbidden to 
attend) suggested that more had been known about this vital issue than was revealed.  
Even Hill’s claim that ‘Australia’ had not engaged in interrogations was 
contested by Rod Barton, who had been a senior member of the Iraq Survey Group 
until he had resigned as a result of his conviction that its work was tainted by 
direction from Washington. As part of the work of the Group on locating Saddam 
Hussein’s WMD, Barton had participated in the questioning of an inmate of Camp 
Cropper in Baghdad, which held ‘high value’ prisoners, including former weapons 
technologists and bureaucrats. According to Barton’s account, when he returned from 
Iraq he expressed concerns about the treatment of prisoners at Camp Cropper. 
Following his completion of a questionnaire regarding his Iraq service, he was 
interviewed by a senior Defence official on 9 June 2004. He then outlined his 
experiences, including his observations of signs of possible abuse of particular 
prisoners, including one who had died in custody. He was then surprised to learn of 
the details of Hill’s denial that Australia was involved in interrogations in Iraq or that 
Australia had had any information indicating prisoner abuse (ABC 2005). The 
government subsequently maintained that he had been involved in attending ‘debriefs’ 
rather than the ‘interrogation’ of prisoners, though his information about his 
experiences was regarded as sufficiently serious to be conveyed directly to the US 
Ambassador, Tom Schieffer (SFADTLC 2005, pp. 84–5).  
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Barton’s revelations exposed the fact that another weapons expert, Dr John 
Gee, had left the Iraq Survey Group in March 2004, again because he had formed the 
view that it was not being allowed to conduct its work free of political interference. 
Upon his return from Iraq, Gee briefed Minister Downer on the ISG and its failure to 
find WMD, yet the Minister continued to refer to the evidence it had discovered as 
supporting elements of the government’s original justification for joining the 
intervention (Allard 2005). In a further contribution to the Iraq debate, Barton later 
disclosed that as late as March 2004 attempts were still being made to avoid the 
obvious in the work of the ISG. In a direct personal intervention, John Scarlett (head 
of the UK Joint Intelligence Committee) sought to insert in the interim report being 
drafted by the ISG unfounded suggestions that Saddam’s regime had been working on 
various weapons programs that could then be cited in justification of the invasion 
(Barnett 2005). Scarlett was subsequently promoted to the position of head of MI6. 
Meanwhile, the impact of the occupation regime on the domestic dynamics of 
Iraq was considerable, motivating some Iraqis to mount what was usually described 
by the government as an ‘insurgency’. It also had ramifications well beyond Iraq to 
the global ‘war on terrorism’. In these circumstances it might have been expected that 
internal developments in Iraq would be monitored closely, since the fate of that 
country and also perhaps of the wider conflict was at stake. Yet it emerged, again as a 
result of Senate Committee hearings, that ONA could form no estimate of Iraqi 
casualties during the occupation, did ‘not have access to any sources of information 
that would shed any particular light’ on this question and was taking no steps to 
remedy this lack of such crucial information (SF&PALC 2005a, p. 143). The context 
for this question was a widely publicised estimate that 100 000 civilian casualties had 
been the result of the conflict; a later UN estimate published in May 2005 put the 
number at around 24 000. At a subsequent hearing the ONA Director-General, Peter 
Varghese, demonstrated a greater familiarity with these estimates, but as he frankly 
observed, ‘Just as I cannot offer you a reliable number on the overall size of the 
insurgency, I cannot offer you a reliable number on the foreign fighter component of 
the insurgency’ (SF&PALC 2005b, p. 106).  
In short, Australian personnel were clearly participants in many aspects of the 
occupation process, and information was available from those personnel – had it been 
effectively gathered, analysed, and collated with information from other sources – to 
form a good estimate of the situation in Iraq. Yet this opportunity had been strangely 
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neglected, and the overall character and consequences of the occupation was not the 
subject of that comprehensive analysis that might have been expected. Thus was the 
state of the management of intelligence on Iraq when the government announced that 
troops would return to that theatre. 
 
The Bali bombing 
 
Closer to home, the uncovering of the activities of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in Indonesia 
brought the threat of terrorism to Australia’s immediate region and touched directly 
the lives and interests of Australian citizens. Immediately following the Bali terrorist 
bombing of 12 October 2002 that claimed eighty-eight Australian lives (discussed 
elsewhere in this book), media reports appeared suggesting that prior intelligence of 
such an attack had been received but no specific warnings had been given. 
Accordingly, the government instructed the Inspector General of Intelligence and 
Security (IGIS) to review all intelligence records to examine this claim. Bill Blick 
concluded that no such specific intelligence existed, though he also found that some 
intelligence reports did list Bali as a possible target at some point for a terrorist attack 
(IGIS 2002). The fact that, in the light of this intelligence, DFAT apparently did not 
alert Australians sufficiently to the dangers of visiting Bali remained a matter of 
public concern. As a response, the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 
References Committee initiated hearings on the performance of DFAT and other 
agencies regarding the assessment of threats to the security of Australians in 
Southeast Asia. The Committee’s report was eventually published in August 2004 
(Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee 2004). 
These Committee hearings helped establish also something of the picture of 
the intelligence available to the government and how it was used. Before 11 
September, DIO was already aware of the risk of Islamic extremism in Indonesia. In 
September 2001, ONA referred to the possibility of an attack on a Bali hotel as a 
‘symbolic’ target. In June 2002 ONA briefed Minister Downer and some of his senior 
staff on the threat posed by JI in the region, a briefing assessed by a member of the 
ONA team as an ‘eye-opener’ for DFAT. At this meeting Downer raised the issue of 
amending the travel advisory for Australian citizens going to Indonesia. ASIO was 
especially aware of such threats, and in October 2002 went as far as to suggest that an 
attack on Australians in Indonesia might be ‘imminent’. Throughout this period 
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ASIO’s threat assessment for Indonesia was ‘High’. As the Committee’s report notes 
of this assessment: 
 
[T]he raising of the level to HIGH came before other important factors began 
to further elevate Australia’s profile as a terrorist target, notably the 
announcement of Australia’s deployment of troops to Afghanistan, and the 
speech by Osama bin Laden which referred to ‘crusader Australian forces.’ It 
also came before the revelations about JI’s transformation into a terrorist 
organisation, and before information extracted from the custodial examination 
of al-Qaeda operative Umar Faruq that confirmed al-Qaeda’s substantial and 
long-standing links with JI (Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 
References Committee 2004, p. 28, emphasis in the original) 
 
It was these and other factors that led the Inspector General to find that there had been 
no specific ‘intelligence failure’ in the period before the Bali attack.  
Nevertheless, the parliamentary inquiry did hear the view that there was 
insufficient co-ordination between the process of threat assessment and the 
preparation of travel advisories. It also revealed shortcomings in the procedures for 
cooperation between DFAT and ONA. While members of the latter attending the 
inquiry insisted, for example, that there had been a follow-up meeting dealing with 
specific questions raised by Downer’s staff as a result of their June briefing on JI, 
DFAT officers insisted that this meeting was never held. Blick was inclined – though 
on what specific grounds was not clear – to accept the DFAT account. The fact that 
there could be such a difference was itself far from reassuring, and suggested a less 
than whole-of-government approach to the problem. Overall, the inquiry expressed 
both a general criticism of the inadequate way in which DFAT travel advisories 
reflected current threat assessments, and also a specific criticism of statements about 
Bali. Rather than emphasise the fact that threats that existed at that location were no 
less than those that existed in Indonesia generally, references were made to tourist 
services there operating ‘normally’. Further, this statement, or variations on it, 
appeared in every advisory in the period in question and was the only context in 
which Bali was specifically mentioned. Australians thus too easily formed the 
impression that Bali was ‘a place apart’, with disastrous consequences.  
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Partisan uses of intelligence 
 
By this time, claims and counter-claims regarding intelligence and its justification for 
the government’s position on the ‘war on terrorism’ had entered the mainstream of 
partisan political exchange. Following Wilkie’s much publicised resignation, his 
character and expertise came under sustained assault. In a newspaper article in June 
2003, Andrew Bolt held up to ridicule an analysis that Wilkie had written for ONA on 
the possible adverse humanitarian impact of a conflict (Bolt 2003). As Opposition 
foreign affairs spokesperson, Kevin Rudd, pointed out in Parliament, the leaking of a 
document classified AUSTEO (Australian Eyes Only) was a serious offence, a point 
reinforced by the revelation that ONA had especially released a copy of the report in 
June and that Senator Sandy MacDonald appeared also to have knowledge of the 
document during his questioning of Wilkie before a Senate Committee (CAPD 2003b; 
Robertson 2004). However, an AFP investigation of the incident did not lead to 
prosecutions. 
The government became even more ruthless in dealing with any hint of dissent. 
In an interview on the Sunday program on 14 March 2004 the Federal Police 
Commissioner, Mick Keelty, suggested that if Islamic terrorists were responsible for 
the Madrid bombing (which claimed 191 lives three days earlier and was a factor in 
the adverse electoral opinion that ousted the government of José María Aznar) it 
would be ‘more likely to be linked to the position that Spain and other allies took on 
issues such as Iraq’. He went on to observe that ‘there’s a level of honesty that has to 
exist here in terms of what the problems are here, not only in Australia but in our 
region’ (Sunday 2004). According to press reports, Keelty was immediately contacted 
by a member of the Prime Minister’s staff who voiced displeasure at this opinion and 
instructed him to publish a correction. Meanwhile, in an extensive interview, the 
Foreign Minister expressed the doubly dismissive opinion, first, that as against ASIO 
‘the police ... aren’t an analytical organisation’, and second, that in taking such a 
position Keelty was ‘expressing a view which reflects a lot of the propaganda we’re 
getting from al Qa’eda’ (Downer 2004c). Downer reiterated the view that ‘Australia is 
a country that is threatened by al Qa’eda, because of what Australia stands for’ rather 
than as a response to policies taken by the government, including in connection with 
Iraq. In the event, Keelty published a ‘clarification’ of his statement, though many 
security specialists considered that he had merely been stating the obvious. 
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Once again in response to the Keelty incident the Prime Minister used an 
appeal to the intelligence agencies. It was ASIO rather than the AFP who had the role 
of assessing the level of threat to Australia and in the period following the invasion of 
Iraq there was no change in that level, therefore – on the Prime Minister’s reasoning – 
participation in the US campaign in Iraq did not expose Australians to any further risk 
of terrorist action. This was the position taken by the Prime Minister in his response to 
a question from Mark Latham, the Leader of the Opposition, on Keelty’s remarks 
(CAPD 2004a, p. 26757). Latham’s riposte was to move a censure motion alleging 
political interference in the work of the AFP. Predictably, this was defeated along 
party lines (CAPD 2004a, pp. 26771 ff), though in the exchange Latham was able to 
point out that, amongst others, Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy-Secretary of the US 
Department of Defense, seemed to agree with Keelty’s opinion. In his contribution the 
Prime Minister reiterated his argument regarding the primary role of ASIO in threat 
assessments and regarding the advice he had received from that body, adding that 
‘Nobody in the intelligence or security community dissented from that advice. ASIS 
did not dissent. ONA did not dissent’ (CAPD 2004a, p. 26778).  
In this atmosphere, the Prime Minister appeared determined to drive home the 
assertion that his position on national security was based upon the advice of the 
intelligence bureaucracies. First, in seeking to undermine Latham’s claim that the 
basis for his policy of withdrawing Australian troops from Iraq by the end of the year 
included briefings on the issue by officials, the Prime Minister stated to the House of 
Representatives that ‘I have in my hand a letter dated today, written by the Deputy 
Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’ that records no such 
briefing as having been held (CAPD 2004b, p. 27550). In response, Latham cited two 
meetings with ‘Foreign and Defence officials’ on 5 January and 11 February during 
which ‘lengthy discussions’ were conducted (CAPD 2004b, p. 27576). Howard 
responded by taking the unusual step of discussing the briefings the Leader of the 
Opposition had received from the Deputy Director of the Defence Department on the 
work of DSD as well as from a senior official on the operations of ASIS. Regarding 
the latter he quoted a letter stating that, according to the recollection of the official 
involved, ‘there was no substantive discussion on the role of the ADF in Iraq’ (CAPD 
2004b, p. 27613). This letter, from ASIS Director General David Irvine, was 
subsequently tabled. In reply, Latham contested this interpretation of these briefings, 
revealing further details of these meetings in the process.  
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These claims and counter-claims set the stage for a full-scale debate on 
Latham’s veracity. The Opposition was able to expose to ridicule the Prime Minister’s 
erroneous view of past Labor resolutions on Iraq policy. Far from Latham inventing 
on the run a Labor commitment to troop withdrawal, he was able to show that this had 
been shadow cabinet and caucus policy for twelve months, a fact that had even been 
reported in some newspapers. On the substance of the briefings, the Prime Minister 
referred again to the letter from Irvine. He had also secured a letter from Ron 
Bonighton, Deputy Secretary Intelligence and Security in the Defence Department, 
which gave his account of the meeting with Latham. Bonighton wrote that ‘there was 
no discussion of policy or strategic matters relating to the deployment of ADF forces 
in Iraq’ though examples were mentioned of ‘the role of intelligence in providing 
operational support to the ADF in Iraq’ (CAPD 2004c, p. 27735). Further, he then 
tabled a letter from the Defence Secretary which stated the following: 
 
I am advised that neither the Chief of the Defence Force, the Vice Chief of the 
Defence Force, the Chief of Navy, the Chief of Army, the Chief of Air Force, 
the Deputy Secretary Intelligence and Security, the Deputy Secretary Strategy 
nor the heads of strategic operations or international policy divisions have 
provided any briefing to Mr Latham on the subject of Iraq (CAPD 2004c, p. 
27736). 
 
Latham’s counter-motion sought, in part, to censure the Prime Minister for ‘revealing 
details of confidential briefings on national security given to the Leader of the 
Opposition by Australian security and intelligence agencies’, and ‘undermining the 
political independence and integrity of our intelligence agencies by asking them to 
provide information with the specific intent of undermining the Opposition’ (CAPD 
2004c, pp. 27736–7). The outcome of the motions in question was of course 
determined along party lines, but in the process the government exhibited an emphatic 
reliance upon documentary evidence obtained from officials, a tactic the Opposition 
was able to pillory in the light of the way in which the AFP Commissioner had been 
instructed to issue a correction to the views he had expressed in his interview of 14 
March. In his diary, published in 2005, Latham observed that in the parliamentary 
debate, Downer, ‘in effect … outed ASIS as operating inside Iraq’, adding ‘I can’t 
believe he didn’t cop major political flak for such a reckless, politically desperate 
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move’ (Latham 2005, p. 278). Throughout this sorry episode, the partisan use of 
transactions with officials did little to contribute to the entrenching of the principle of 
bureaucratic neutrality and expertise. There was some irony here given the Prime 
Minister’s standard retort to questions regarding the Iraq commitment which was to 
repeat that he had been acting ‘upon advice’.  
 
The Collins affair and intelligence management 
 
Following the appearance of the report of the Parliamentary Committee, but while 
Flood’s work had yet to be completed, the Australian intelligence community was 
convulsed by allegations regarding agency bias and personal vendettas made public 
by Lt Col Lance Collins, who had served as C2 (head of intelligence) with 
INTERFET (International Force East Timor). Though the origins of this affair lay in 
events during the East Timor intervention (1999–2000) its denouement was revealing 
of the management of intelligence in the period considered in this paper. Collins had 
originally complained to the then Defence Minister, John Moore, in December 2000 
of the pro-Indonesian bias of some Defence personnel and especially members of DIO. 
His complaints had been assessed by the IGIS, Bill Blick, who in a report to the 
Minister in May 2003 had found them without substance. Collins had by then 
submitted a Redress of Grievance to the Army raising these issues as well as 
complaints about career and professional reverses he had suffered since making his 
original submission to Minister Moore. Unsatisfied with the outcome of the latter 
process, Collins wrote to the Prime Minister on 18 March 2004 maintaining that a 
string of intelligence failures, including in relation to the existence of WMD in Iraq, 
warning of the Bali bombing, the Sandline affair in Papua New Guinea (PNG), the 
independence of East Timor and the breakdown of order in the Solomon Islands was 
indicative of a ‘failure of institutional controls over the Australian intelligence 
system’ (ABC 2004). As to Blick’s report, Collins suggested it was manifestly 
deficient. He also complained that he had not been informed of the outcome of his 
Redress of Grievance even though an ADF legal officer had completed an assessment 
of his case and forwarded it to the Army on 7 September 2003. 
In his reply which was made public the following month, the Prime Minister 
offered a dead bat. On Australia’s Iraq intelligence, he ignored the absence of WMD, 
instead remarking that ‘some key judgements made by Australian intelligence 
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agencies before the war have since been confirmed by the Iraq Survey Group.’ Even 
at the time, this statement was at the extreme limits of accuracy. On Bali and Iraq the 
government’s position was repeated. On East Timor, where Collins’ claims were 
specifically investigated by the IGIS in 2003, the Prime Minister approvingly cited 
Blick as having had the definitive view that they were without foundation. And on 
perhaps the most serious of Collins’ concerns – that at a crucial period in December 
1999 DIO had deliberately withdrawn access by INTERFET to the secret intelligence 
database TOPIC –Howard referred to the joint view of the Chief of the Defence Force 
(CDF) and the Defence Secretary (expressed in a letter to the Australian) that such an 
action had not taken place. As Peter Cosgrove and Ric Smith said in their statement, 
‘Any suggestion that [‘the Defence intelligence agencies’] … would place in jeopardy 
the safety of our troops is repugnant’ (DOD 2004a). 
In his letter, Collins described Flood as an ‘insider’ and his inquiry as 
therefore necessarily ‘limited’. When Flood’s report appeared, the text seemed to 
validate this characterization. He spent several pages on Collins: 
 
The inquiry looked at all assessments on Indonesia produced by DIO (and by 
ONA) from 1998 to May 2004. The Inquiry found no evidence of pro-Jakarta 
or pro-Indonesian assessments. 
The present situation in ONA and DIO is that there is no evidence of any 
pressure on either organization, or pressure within either organization to 
produce pro-Indonesian assessments or to tone down any criticism of 
Indonesia. … 
[T]he …Inquiry …found no evidence whatsoever that the current Director of 
DIO, Mr Frank Lewincamp, has exerted pressure of any kind on his analysts 
to reach particular conclusions or that he expected analysts to report what the 
government might be presumed to have wanted to hear. ...  
Lieutenant Colonel Collins has alleged that a DIO senior officer or senior 
officers deliberately withheld, for a short period in December 1999, access 
by Australian forces in East Timor, as part of INTERFET, to a classified 
intelligence database. The then Inspector-General of Intelligence and 
Security, Mr Blick, investigated this matter and concluded in May 2003 that 
there was no policy decision to withdraw such access (Flood 2004, pp. 48–9). 
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Flood proceeded to discuss an Intelligence Estimate on East Timor produced by 
Collins at Headquarters Australian Theatre on 8 July 1998. While the analysis of East 
Timor in the document was described as competent, its usefulness to Defence was 
apparently undermined by the inclusion of comments on extraneous matters even 
including domestic Australian politics. Flood recorded that DIO and the Defence 
Department accordingly complained to the Headquarters regarding this aspect of the 
estimate. Collins later claimed that his prediction of military-instigated militia 
violence had been deemed unacceptable to the intelligence establishment.  
The seriousness of Collins’ allegations should not be underestimated. His view 
that DIO and other bureaucratic organs of government were dominated by individuals 
favourable to Indonesia – and therefore inclined to discount evidence of military 
violence or malevolence – was one that had often been made (ABC 2004; c/f 
Fernandes 2004, pp. 4–25) though Collins was especially in a position to cite chapter 
and verse. His claim that his career had been blighted by the Director of DIO and 
other senior officials when he raised this matter was perhaps of greater moment. His 
name had appeared in September 2000 on an AFP warrant to investigate the leakage 
of sensitive intelligence material, though no evidence was ever found to suggest he 
had been involved in such activities. According to his testimony, in relation to the 
pursuit of a possible foreign spy within the ADF, he had been threatened in the 
context of an official interview with the kind of pressure that ‘could even force people 
to commit suicide’, an apparent reference to the death of DIO liaison officer Mervyn 
Jenkins in Washington in 1999 (Toohey 2003). When the full record of the interviews 
undertaken to assess his Redress of Grievance became available to the press, it 
became evident that the issue was much larger than the role of one outspoken and 
possibly difficult intelligence officer (Lyons 2004). 
The Collins case refused to go away. Defence handling of the Redress of 
Grievance process further muddied the waters. In April 2004 Defence issued a release 
on the case stating that the original review of the Redress of Grievance had been 
judged to have miscarried (Hill 2004a). It emerged, however, that when the original 
findings, by Captain Martin Toohey, suggested that Collins’ main claims were 
vindicated, Defence had sought not one but two legal opinions before they finally 
found one that overturned Toohey’s determination. In December 2004 there was a 
remarkable development. Senator Hill released a media statement indicating that the 
new IGIS, Ian Carnell, had further considered the issues involved, on the direction of 
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the Minister (Hill 2004b). In advice to the Minister he had concluded that in one 
particular his predecessor’s investigation had been ‘comprehensive’ but ‘not 
exhaustive’ (Carnell 2004). Following interviews and other forensic work he had been 
able to conclude, regarding Collins’ claim of an intelligence black-out, that ‘access to 
the intelligence database had been deliberately turned off’. During Estimates hearings 
Carnell explained that three individuals involved at the time of the incident had not 
been interviewed by Blick, and it was also necessary to run checks to determine if the 
problem had been of a technical nature (SF&PALC 2005a, pp. 135–8). Though the 
Minister promised the speedy release of a public version of Carnell’s report, it did not 
appear for many months. When it was released on 25 August in a heavily censored 
form the precise responsibility for the intelligence denial was still unclear, though 
Carnell was of the view that the Director’s assertion that he had not given a direction 
to that effect was credible (IGIS 2005). What was apparent from the fragmentary text 
was that statements had been made to the previous inquiry that had misled Blick, 
though the issue of whether these were the exclusive cause of the former Inspector 
General’s erroneous findings was not addressed. Meanwhile, Collins had resigned 
from the ADF, given public interviews and co-authored a book intended to argue the 
case that the Australian intelligence agencies were seriously compromised by 
politicised management (Collins and Reed 2005). 
 
Terrorism: the official version 
 
It has already been shown that the government was firmly of the view that Al Qaeda 
and its allies and surrogates had targeted Australia not because of the nation’s actual 
policies but rather for its values and character. This position was made very clear in 
the aftermath to Keelty’s remarks on the Madrid bombing, and was further underlined 
as government policy with the release of Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to 
Australia. In explaining the decision to prepare an intelligence-based White Paper on 
this topic, the Foreign Minister argued on 13 April 2004 that this step was necessary 
in order for the public to comprehend the threat that terrorism posed to Australia and 
how it might be overcome. He was insistent on the view that the central element in the 
conflict with terrorism would be a ‘battle of ideas’ (Downer 2004a). Expanding on 
this position in July, following the release of the document, he was emphatic that ‘it’s 
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not what we’ve done but what we are which inflames the terrorists’ unassuageable 
sense of grievance’ (Downer 2004b). The White Paper expanded on this theme:  
 
Australia is a target for complex reasons. But we can distil all the invective 
and rhetoric to a basic premise. These terrorists feel threatened by us, and by 
our example as a conspicuously successful modern society. We are in their 
way… 
The core values we hold and which are intrinsic to our success as a liberal 
democratic culture are anathema to these extremists. For them, our beliefs in 
democratic process, racial and gender equality, religious tolerance and 
equality of opportunity are mere human inventions at odds with God’s law. 
These values impede their political goals. They are confronted by the reality 
that it is not only people of the West who value such freedoms. 
And we advance our values through an active foreign policy… But the essence 
of their objections is not our actions. Rather, it is our example as a people and 
as a society, and the values we stand for (DFAT 2004b, p. 67). 
 
The government thereby not only entered the complex debate on the character of 
terrorism but adopted a firm – and highly contentious – position in that debate. By the 
time the White Paper appeared a considerable volume of ink had been spilt on this 
question, and there were many specialist commentators who held a contrary view. As 
Gilles Kepel (the author of probably the most comprehensive academic study of the 
concept of jihad) argued in his extremely influential book, The War for Muslim Minds, 
there was ‘nothing irrational’ in the 9/11 attack. It was not an act of blind hatred, but 
based upon a calculated strategy of shifting the struggle of radical Islamists from that 
with the ‘nearby enemy’ (to use the terminology of Ayman al-Zawahiri) of apostate 
Arab regimes to ‘an immediate, merciless war against the “faraway enemy”’, thereby 
overcoming ‘their inability [heretofore] to mobilize popular support to overthrow 
established regimes and replace them with an Islamic state’ (Kepel 2004, p. 72).  
There was one battle of ideas, however, that the Minister was not keen to enter 
and that was the impact of the Iraq intervention on local and global terrorism. While 
conceding in the April speech that ‘the terrorists have made Iraq the frontline in their 
unholy war’ he did not want to analyse the reasons for this being the case. Australia 
should be proud of the intervention to topple Saddam and get on with the 
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reconstruction of the country, rather than choosing to ‘cut and run’. In these 
circumstances it is perhaps unsurprising that the final chapter of the government’s 
White Paper is entitled ‘An Enduring Campaign’. As it notes: ‘The notion of “root 
causes” is misleading. It implies there is something we can offer or correct to mitigate 
the threat. But Bin Laden and his ilk are not seeking remedy or compromise, only 
subjugation to their views’ (DFAT 2004b, p. 105). 
On 22 February 2005 the Prime Minister announced that a contingent of 450 
troops would be dispatched to Southern Iraq to serve as protection for Japan’s 
contingent of peacekeepers. For the force to be appropriately briefed, that neglect of 
the analysis of the situation in Iraq noted earlier was presumably corrected in order to 
provide the force commanders with the protection afforded by the comprehensive 
deployment of intelligence resources. The task of DIO and the other members of the 
AIC was, however, unenviable since their Iraq specialists were aware that the 
contingent was under instructions to deal with an insurgency a principal cause of 
which was denied, against much of the evidence, by the government. Once again the 
parallels with Australia’s Vietnam task were uncomfortable. 
 
The AWB oil-for-wheat scandal 
 
In November 2005, Terence Cole QC was appointed to convene a commission of 
inquiry to determine whether any Australian company (in practice, the Australian 
Wheat Board (AWB)), had breached any Australian laws in business dealings with 
Iraq in contravention of UN Security Council Resolution 661. The Cole Commission 
followed the findings (published in October 2005) of the Volcker Report – the 
Manipulation of the Oil-for-Food Programme by the Iraqi Regime – that named the 
AWB as having had the major role in abuses of the arrangements whereby the UN 
permitted Iraq to use a proportion of its oil revenues held in escrow account to be used 
for the purchase of food and other humanitarian supplies. Volcker found that from 
2000, some 41 contracts negotiated by the AWB for the supply of wheat to Iraq 
included surcharge payments of around $300 million (US$221 million) that had found 
their way to the Saddam regime (Independent Inquiry Committee 2005). Although 
Cole did not convene formal hearings until January 2006, the behaviour of the AWB 
had been an issue in the United States for some time. In October 2003 members of 
Congress (including Senate minority leader Tom Daschle) had complained to 
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President Bush that a contract concluded between the AWB and the Saddam regime 
in December 2002 had incorporated an unusually high price for wheat supplied to Iraq, 
and that this matter should be investigated prior to the conclusion of the FTA with 
Australia. Treasury officials seconded to the Iraq administration following the 
invasion had warned in October 2003 that corrupt revenues derived from the oil-for-
food program had been used to fund the Iraqi reime’s weapons programs (Wilkinson 
2006). In this atmosphere, a personal intervention of Ambassador Thawley in October 
2004 had dissuaded Senator Norm Coleman, chair of the Senate permanent 
subcommittee on investigations, to pursue the AWB transactions identified by 
Volcker (Gawends and Wilkinson 2006).  
 This issue was one involving government oversight at many stages of the 
process. All AWB contracts were submitted to DFAT and then conveyed to the UN 
by way of Australia’s representative in New York.  It was also the responsibility of 
the Wheat Export Authority to scrutinise AWB contracts. As US trade negotiators had 
observed of the AWB, though it was a listed company its monopoly role and the fact 
that the Australian government was quick to defend it left the impression that its 
connection with government was unlike that of a private trading entity. To what 
extent, then, could the government be charged with responsibility for complicity in 
helping sustain a regime which, simultaneously, it was insistent had to be displaced as 
a matter of supreme national security? If officials in DFAT and in the intelligence 
agencies had been insufficiently vigilant of Australia’s responsibilities regarding the 
Saddam regime – perhaps an unlikely circumstance, given the post September 11 
concern with Iraq – the head of Australia’s UN Mission could have been expected to 
be familiar with the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 661. It should be 
recalled that Iraq’s systematic violations of UN SC resolutions constituted the official 
legitimation for Australia’s participation in the overthrow of the Saddam regime. At 
the very least this episode reflected very poorly upon government claims that 
‘contestability’ was an enduring feature of its management of the organs of policy. 
Significantly, the Prime Minister was to claim that according to ‘the advice’ he 
received from ONA ‘there was no intelligence reporting, that AWB had paid bribes to 
Saddam Hussein’, thus attributing the source for any inaction on the government’s 
part to the lack of information from the intelligence agencies (Howard 2006). As 
Richard Mulgan has observed, in the current climate ‘A cynical public when offered a 
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statement such as “my department assures me” or “our intelligence sources tell us” 
will simply treat it [as] yet more government spin.’ (Mulgan 2006, p.23)  
 
Conclusion 
 
While the notion that intelligence is vital for successful military operations is at least 
as old as Sun Zi, in the era of ‘the revolution in military affairs’ and the doctrine of 
pre-emption it has become the focus of a greater effort than arms themselves or those 
that wield them. While the standard argument in favour of the Australian alliance with 
the US of the ‘great and powerful friends’ genre still applies, the advantages that 
accrue from access to the peerless intelligence resources (and technologies) possessed 
by the US are now more often emphasised by the alliance’s advocates. In the period 
under consideration, however, the domestic management of the intelligence 
connection with the United States generated as many advantages as liabilities. With 
ADF personnel embedded in CENTCOM (US Central Command) and privy to the 
earliest plans for war in Iraq, an administration in Washington determined from the 
outset (for reasons still unclear) to remove Saddam Hussein, and no influential 
political leader prepared or able to dispute the intelligence basis of this policy, 
Australia became a direct and uncritical participant in the invasion coalition. That Iraq 
subsequently became, as the government conceded, the focus of global terrorism was 
a development that might have been anticipated, though the same government strained 
public credulity to insist that the dynamics at this focus were not having a major 
impact on terrorist recruitment and activities elsewhere. What Australia gained from 
US efforts to constrain terrorism in Southeast Asia, it lost by being intimately 
associated with the war in and occupation of Iraq. To a significant degree, this failure 
stemmed from poor intelligence management. As has been argued in this paper, this 
management failure was partly a product of unsatisfactory systems, partly a 
consequence of the disinclination to interrogate intelligence when the policy it might 
have seemed to recommend ran contrary to alliance dynamics.  
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